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Summary. We measure trust and trustworthiness in British society with a newly designed exper-
iment using real monetary rewards and a sample of the British population. The study also asks
the typical survey question that aims to measure trust, showing that it does not predict ‘trust’
as measured in the experiment. Overall, about 40% of people were willing to trust a stranger in
our experiment, and their trust was rewarded half of the time. Analysis of variation in the trust
behaviour in our survey suggests that trusting is more likely if people are older, their financial
situation is either ‘comfortable’ or ‘difficult’ compared with ‘doing alright’ or ‘just getting by’, they
are a homeowner or they are divorced, separated or never married compared with those who
are married or cohabiting.Trustworthiness also is more likely among subjects who are divorced
or separated relative to those who are married or cohabiting, and less likely among subjects
who perceive their financial situation as ‘just getting by’ or ‘difficult’. We also analyse the effect
of attitudes towards risks on trust.
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1. Introduction
Trust is an important lubricant for social and economic transactions. Higher levels of trust and
trustworthiness can reduce transaction costs by allowing the use of informal agreements instead
of complex contracts and their costly enforcement. For example, in many instances, a ‘princi-
pal’ delegates tasks to an ‘agent’ whose objectives are different, and the principal cannot check
completely the agent’s performance (e.g. bad outcomes could arise from low effort or bad luck).
Everyday examples include taking your car to a mechanic, hiring a baby-sitter and employing
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a research assistant. Even when performance monitoring is possible, it is often too costly to
devise a contract that fully accounts for all the possible contingencies of the relationship. Costly
contracting, in the absence of effective informal agreements based on trusting others to fulﬁl
their part and on abiding by such agreements when others trust us to do so, may preclude
beneﬁcial transactions. Even when interacting with strangers, trust is important for the smooth
functioning of society; for example, taxi-drivers must trust that the passenger will pay the bill
at the destination. Thus, opportunities for mutually beneﬁcial transactions are lost in societies
in which people cannot trust each other.
The primary aim of our research is to obtain measures of the extent of trust and trustworthi-
ness inBritish society for simple trust situations involving strangers, inwhich stakes are relatively
small and, even though there are no contractual obligations, ‘trustees’ are clear about the trust-
ers’ expectations. We also study how trust and trustworthiness vary by certain characteristics
of the British population.
A common approach is to try to measure trust in surveys, through responses to questions
such as the following (from the World Values Survey, General Social Survey (US) and British
Household Panel Study (BHPS)): ‘Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be
trusted, or that you can’t be too careful in dealing with people?’. Answers to questions such as
this are difﬁcult to evaluate, however, partly because they are attitudinal and partly because the
questions themselves are too generic: the answers do not reveal either the reference group or the
types of action or the stakes that respondents have in mind when making such an assessment;
and variations in any of these respects could be large. Nevertheless, this question has been used
to measure trust in around 500 references that analyse the economic effects of trust (according
to Sapienza et al. (2007)), and in particular it has been employed to study trust in Britain as a
function of individual attributes and measures of neighbourhood attachment, social networks
and civic participation (Li et al., 2005).
Even if one thought that there was some value in asking this type of survey question about
trust, attitudinal questions about a person’s trustworthiness would be useless for obvious rea-
sons. Everyone would reply ‘yes, of course, I am trustworthy!’, and some will be telling the truth,
but we would not know which. As a result, the ample trust literature that relies on survey data
is inevitably silent on the extent to which people’s trust in others is an idiosyncratic disposition,
or a belief or a response to actual trustworthiness. Without some measure of trustworthiness
we have no idea of whether the level of trust reﬂects the level of actual trustworthiness.
An alternative approach, which has spread in recent times, is to measure trust and trust-
worthiness through experiments that use real monetary rewards (see Camerer (2003), page 83
and following feature for a review). This method has the advantage of providing behavioural
measures and of being clearer about the type of situation, the stakes and the reference group—
usually anonymous subjects in the experiment. Experiments also, however, are often carried out
with limitations, one of which is that they are administered mostly to students, who are usually
self-selected subjects and unrepresentative of the adult population (for example compare the
distributions of the measure of ‘trust’ in Bellemare and Kroeger (2007) for their ‘laboratory’
and ‘representative’ samples). Laboratory experiments also usually lack a sufﬁcient range and
variation of information on individual attributes that are needed to investigate the individual
level correlates of both trust and trustworthiness.
To overcome those shortcomings our contribution follows a different approach. We com-
bine the experimental method with both a sample from the general population and the survey
method. This approach makes it possible to obtain sound and representative behavioural mea-
sures of both trusting and trustworthiness, and in addition it allows the gathering of data on
individual attributes. We know of only two other instances, neither of which was in the UK,
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in which trust game experiments (TGEs) have been carried out with a representative sample of
the population and combined with survey questions—one was carried out in Germany (Fehr
et al., 2002) and gave us the original inspiration; the other in the Netherlands (Bellemare and
Kroeger, 2007). Other trust studies have also used population samples (e.g. Barr (2003) and
Schechter (2007)), but ones that are less representative of the population than these two studies.
In addition,we use a new experimental designwhichwas developedbyErmisch andGambetta
(2006) that differs in various ways from the trust game that is used in most trust experiments.
We believe that the differences that we introduce allow it to provide better measures of the
concepts of trust and trustworthiness.
Our main aim is to measure levels of basic trust and trustworthiness in British society in inter-
actions between strangers, including their variation within the population, and also to illustrate
the methods that we use. Although not novel in its broad outline, the particular constellation
of methods that we adopt is original, and its interest may go beyond the study of trust as it
could be applied to investigating other decisions. The paper proceeds as follows. First we clarify
what we mean by ‘trust’ and explain the experiment that we carry out. Next we discuss our sam-
pling frame, procedures, survey methods and the external validity of our experimental measure.
Section 5 presents the main outcomes of the experiment. Section 6 compares behavioural and
survey measures of trust and Section 7 examines the effect of risk attitudes on trust. Section 8
presents our conclusions about measuring trust.
2. What do we mean by ‘trust’?
We work with a notion of trust that relates it to speciﬁc acts and makes it easy to capture it
empirically (Bacharach and Gambetta, 2001). We trust when we trust that someone will do X—
repay a loan; arrive on time; play fair; pay the fare; feed the cat; treat baby well; do his job as
expected. The trust that we have in someone doing X does not necessarily extend to trust in that
same person doing Y.
More precisely, we say that a person ‘trusts someone to do X’ if the truster (a ‘he’ for con-
venience) acts on the expectation that the trustee (a ‘she’) will do X when both know that two
conditions obtain.
(a) If she fails to do X he would have done better to act otherwise—‘if I knew she was a cheat
I would not have lent her the money’. If trust is fulﬁlled the truster is better off than he
would be if he had not trusted, but if trust is not fulﬁlled he is worse off.
(b) His acting in the way that he does gives her the opportunity to pursue a selﬁsh reason not
to do X—‘if I hadn’t lent her the money she could not have cheated me’.
A trustworthy trustee is simply one who does X when those two conditions obtain.
The decision whether to trust or not involves three components. First, we can expect that
subjects will consider the returns to trusting when trust is fulﬁlled relative to the cost of trust
when it is unfulﬁlled. Next, there is the expectation that the trustee will do X, framed in terms of
a probability (Gambetta, 1988; Barr, 2003), and, thirdly, in all cases in which the probability is
less than 1, a person’s willingness to take the risk of being exploited comes into play. In our study
we do not vary the monetary returns and concentrate on the second and third dimensions only.
The level of expectation is the result of beliefs about other people’s trust warranting qualities
with regard to doing X. These beliefs are in turn based, at least in part, on learning through
experience. In most real life circumstances these beliefs refer to speciﬁc people or groups of
people whom we believe share certain trust warranting properties. When interacting with anon-
ymous strangers, trusters’ beliefs can be understood as being not ad personam but about the
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frequency of trust warranting properties relating to doing X in the population of anonymous
trustees—in our case the generic group consisting of people living in theUKand participating in
the experiment. The willingness to take the risk of exposure captures a preference or disposition
relating to the character traits and state of mind of the truster; in addition, this preference may
be responsive to the nature of the trust situation itself: a person may be more willing to take
risks in lending one’s car than in employing a baby-sitter.
3. Experimental design
3.1. The experiment
The game that we presented to subjects, whom we shall call the truster (R, ‘he’) for convenience
and the trustee (E, ‘she’), is a basic ‘one-shot’ trust game in binary form. (The computer-assisted
personal interview script for the experiment is given inAppendixA.)R receives a £10banknote at
the onset of a professional interviewer’s visit to his home; it is described as compensation for tak-
ing part in the interview cum experiment.R is told that hewill have the opportunity to obtain £22
if he gives themoney to another person (E)withwhomhe has been randomlymatched and about
whom he is told nothing. He is told that the experimenter will increase it by £30 and so E will
receive £40,who thenwill be offered the choice either topayback£22 toR,or tokeepall £40. If he
decides to give £10, R is informed that hewill know the outcome of E’s decision in about 4weeks.
The procedures ensure that the interviewer does not observe or otherwise know his decision.
If R chooses to pass the £10 on, E is given, by a different interviewer who visits her at her
home, two cheques that are made out in her name: one for £40 and one for £18, either of which
she can cash without delay. E is told that R was informed that E would be making the choice
of whether to pay back £22 to R or to keep the whole £40 before R decided to pass on £10.
Again, the interviewer does not know her decision. Our procedures are thus, in a sense, ‘double
blind’: the interviewer knows the subjects’ name and address but not their decisions, whereas
the researcher knows the subjects’ decisions, but identiﬁes them by their code numbers, not
associating them to their name or address.
The pay-offs that we used in the experiment are illustrated in Fig. 1. If R decides to pass on
the £10 it means that he ‘trusts’ in the precise sense deﬁned above: that he expects E to resist the
pull of her ‘raw’ monetary pay-offs and to return the £22. We have chosen the amount speciﬁed
to be paid back in the case that E fulﬁls trust in a way that makes the pay-offs asymmetric.
Symmetric payments may encourage fulﬁlling trust for reasons of fairness, rather than because
E does what is expected of her (for example see Bacharach et al. (2001), Bohnet and Huck (2004)
and Bohnet et al. (2005)).
F
E
[10, 0]  
R V
[22, 18]
[0, 40]
Fig. 1. Structure of pay-offs in theTGE (F, fulfil trust;V, violate trust):R’s pay-offs are listed first in the brackets
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For half of the sample we used a second treatment, in which R receives £12 in cash (a £10 note
and a £2 coin) as compensation for taking part in the interview cum experiment. R is offered the
binary choice of either keeping the whole £12 or giving £10 to E and keeping £2. The remaining
steps are the same as in the previous treatment. There was no signiﬁcant difference in behaviour
between these two treatments, and so we shall not distinguish between them in the rest of the
paper.
The outcome variables of interest are the probability that R passes £10 on (‘trusts’) and the
probability that E pays back the £22 (‘fulﬁls trust’).
3.2. Key features of our design
Our design differs from that of the standard TGE (Berg et al., 1995; Glaeser et al., 2000), which
was also used by Fehr et al. (2002) and Bellemare and Kroeger (2007). Ermisch and Gambetta
(2006) have provided a detailed critique of the standard TGE, arguing that it lacks the basic
features of a trust situation even in a one-shot case, and, as a result, this blurs the link with clear
notions of trust and trustworthiness and introduces confounding effects. The binary TGE that
was outlined above is more realistic than the standard experiment and more precisely captures
a clear notion of trust and trustworthiness. This is for the following reasons.
(a) R ‘gains’ his money as compensation for taking part in the interview cum experiment and
this is given to him in cash and before the interview begins. We expect that this should
trigger an ‘endowment effect’ and make R more careful in parting with it, as he would be
with his own money.
(b) We depart dramatically from the standard TGE, in which R can pass on any amount, by
forcing R’s exposure to a loss of either all (or 83% in the second treatment) of the sum
that he receives as a participation payment. In our view, the possibility of transferring
any amount favours the intrusion of other motives such as ‘gift giving’, or ‘let’s risk part
of it’. The distribution of amounts that are passed on in standard TGEs is consistent with
the operation of these other motives. It usually covers the entire range, with a distinct
modal value of about 50% of R’s initial endowment and short ‘spikes’ at 0% and 100%
(see Fehr et al. (2002), Bellemare and Kroeger (2007) (their ‘representative sample’) and
Barr (2003)). Freedom to pass on any amount confounds these other motives with trust,
which is a relevant consideration in the decision if and only if R’s decision is driven by
his self-interested aim to gain more if trust is fulﬁlled.
(c) In the standard TGE, E can return any amount to R. In our design, R knows in advance
howmuch he can expect back fromE if E fulﬁls trust, and E knows that this was an expec-
tation of R when he made his decision. E thus knows that she cannot be just a little more
or a little less trustworthy; she must choose whether to be trustworthy or not. Thus, in
this binary TGE it is clear what trusting and trustworthiness are, as is common in real
life (e.g. making and repaying a loan). We believe that our design strongly encourages E
to put herself in the situation of a person who has beneﬁted from R’s expectation that
she will return £22. Despite being strangers, E is in the analogous position of the agent
to R’s principal.
4. The sample and survey methods
4.1. The sample
The sample framewas households whowere formerlymembers of the BHPS; they were dropped
from the panel for technical and funding reasons in 2001 and were reinterviewed in 2003 for
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a special study (Jäckle et al., 2004). We randomly selected one person from each household.
An advance letter asking these people whether they would agree to participate explained that
we would be ‘running an experiment on how people make simple ﬁnancial decisions’ as well as
asking questions from a short questionnaire similar to earlier questionnaires. An advantage of
using a sample drawn from people who have participated in the BHPS for several years is that
they are likely to believe that the ﬁeld organization and themanagers of the survey can be trusted
to carry out the experiment and payments as they promise. Trust responses in a new survey are
likely to be contaminated by varying degrees of trust in the organizers of the experiment, in
addition to trust in their co-player. In addition, our subjects are used to receiving compensation
(a voucher) for their participation.
4.2. Procedures
The experiment was carried out ﬁrst. It and subsequent interviews were done face to face by
professional interviewers at the subject’s home. Interviewers were instructed to read only from
the experimental script (see Appendix A) and not to elaborate further. If the subject had difﬁ-
culty understanding, they were instructed to read that particular part of the script, or the whole
script, again. At the conclusion of the full interview, interviewers were asked to report whether
the subjects understood what they were being asked to do in the experiment. The vast major-
ity (94% of Rs and 83% of Es) understood ‘easily’ or ‘very easily’. We randomly matched an
E-player to each R who passed on the money.
We used the same survey organization that carries out the BHPS. As a consequence, many of
the respondents knew the interviewer from previous contact through the BHPS. For example,
63% had the same interviewer as they had in the last year that they were interviewed (2003),
and 31% had the same interviewer in 2003 and in the 2001 BHPS as well as in our experiment
in 2007. On the one hand, this is an advantage because it reinforces trust that the experiment
will be carried out as described. For example, Eckel and Wilson (2004) reported that a large
proportion of subjects participating in a one-shot trust game did not believe that they were
matched with a real person (page 458, footnote 9). On the other hand, knowing the interviewer
may subconsciously incline subjects to trust or be trustworthy in the experiment, despite the
fact that we reiterated several times in the interview script that the interviewer would not know
the subject’s decision (see Appendix A). Those who had the same interviewer in 2001, 2003
and 2007 are more likely both to give £10 (51% compared with 40%) and to return £22 (57%
compared with 46%), but the differences are not statistically signiﬁcant (p-values of 0.18 and
0.36 respectively). Subjects who had the same interviewer in 2003 and 2007 differed in a similar
direction, but again the differences are not sufﬁciently large to be signiﬁcant.
4.3. Survey structure
After completing the experiment, the respondents ﬁlled out a short conﬁdential self-completion
questionnaire on their own that followed up their decision. They then completed a questionnaire
with the interviewer (a computer-assisted personal interview) and ﬁnally another conﬁdential
self-completion questionnaire containing the 12 questions from the general health questionnaire
(GHQ), two questions about willingness to take risks (which had not previously been asked in
the BHPS) and six questions for assessing two of the ‘big ﬁve’ personality traits—‘openness’
and ‘neuroticism’. The computer-assisted personal interview questionnaire allowed us to update
some basic information, such as current employment,marital status, homeownership and ﬁnan-
cial situation, at the time of the experiment. On average, the experiment took 10 min and the
remainder of the survey about 15 min.
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Table 1. Comparison of trust survey and 2005 BHPS respondents†
Variable Mean, Mean,
trust survey 2005 BHPS
Age (years) 53 48
Female 0.61 0.53
Homeowner (outright or mortgage) 0.44 0.77
In paid employment 0.46 0.56
Retired 0.32 0.25
Financial situation
‘Comfortable’ 0.21 0.31
‘Doing alright’ 0.33 0.41
‘Just about getting by’ 0.32 0.22
‘Finding it quite or very difﬁcult’ 0.14 0.06
Divorced or separated 0.19 0.10
Active in organization on regular basis 0.46 0.45
†BHPS weighted with cross-section weights for Great Britain.
4.4. Survey response
In the ﬁrst stage (i.e. Rs), 173 of 245 eligible cases were interviewed: a response rate of 71%.
In the second stage (Es), 85 of 127 eligible cases were interviewed: a response rate of 67%.
Apart from one refusal, all the non-responses arose because of inability to locate the individual
selected. Since we know that the probability of moving in a particular year is inversely related to
the length of current residence (e.g. Morrison (1971) for an early study and Belot and Ermisch
(2006) for evidence from the BHPS), we checked whether non-response may have affected our
inferences by relating the odds of giving the £10 (among Rs) and returning the £22 (among Es)
to length of residence. We found no signiﬁcant effects. Thus, it appears that those who move
more often do not behave differently in terms of trust and trustworthiness.
4.5. How representative is the sample?
Considering some key dimensions, relative to the 2005 BHPS (Table 1), our sample over-repre-
sents women, people who are retired, older, divorced or separated and those who describe their
ﬁnancial situation as ‘just getting by’ or ‘difﬁcult’, whereas it under-represents homeowners and
people whose ﬁnancial circumstances make them feel that they are ‘comfortable’ or ‘doing
alright’. Being conservative, the sample can at least be taken as representative of households
with low tomoderate income. (The focus on lower income peoplemay also have its serendipitous
advantages because the sums of money that are involved in the experiment may be more impor-
tant to them.)Analysis inErmisch et al. (2007) strongly suggests that thepercentages trustingand
being trustworthy should be similar to those for a more representative sample of the population.
4.6. External validity
Even if our results were perfectly representative of what the British population would do when
participating in an experiment such as ours, it still does not follow that their behaviour in the
experiment carries over to real life trust situations. Scrutiny by investigators in experiments
may exaggerate pro-social behaviour relative to environments without such scrutiny. Absence
of anonymity—whether between subjects or between subjects and interviewer (such as famil-
iarity with interviewers which we discussed above)—tends to work in the same direction. In
our experiment, we used procedures that ensured that interviewers did not know the partic-
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Table 2. Means and standard deviations
Variable Mean N
(standard deviation)
Give £10 0.429 170
Return £22 0.500 84
Age (years) 53.3 254
(16.9)
Female 0.61 254
Financial situation
‘Comfortable’ 0.21 254
‘Doing alright’ 0.33 254
‘Just about getting by’ 0.32 254
‘Finding it difﬁcult’ 0.14 254
Homeowner 0.44 254
Married or cohabiting 0.46 246
Widow(er) 0.16 246
Divorced or separated 0.19 246
Never married 0.19 246
Active in organization on regular basis 0.46 254
‘Poor’ mental health (GHQ caseness >2) 0.31 224
Neurotic 0 222
(0.8)
Openness 0 221
(0.8)
Willingness to take risks in trusting strangers 3.4 234
(2.4)
General willingness to take risks 4.4 233
(2.6)
% who say ‘most people can be trusted’ 38 254
ipant’s decision (e.g. sealed envelopes), and we clearly pointed this out to participants in the
interview script (Appendix A). In addition, participants had no information at all about their
counterparts, guaranteeing strict anonymity between subjects.
It has been suggested that, in games such as the trust game, ﬁnancial concerns increase in
prominence relative to pro-social behaviour as the stakes increase (Levitt and List, 2007). We
did not vary the stakes, but our pay-offs are large compared with most other TGEs, in both
laboratories or with representative samples. However, compared with experiments with samples
in poor countries (Barr, 2003; Schechter, 2007), our stakes are relatively small. It is safe to say
that inferences from our experiment may only be valid for real life trust situations with low to
moderate stakes.
In so far as beliefs are based on experience, past experience is important for people’s deci-
sions in experiments. For example, the studies by Henrich et al. (2004), which used the so-called
‘ultimatum game’ with the same protocols (including pay-offs and description of the game)
in 15 different small-scale communities, found that the past experiences and social norms that
participants brought to the game inﬂuenced the outcomes. In the more technical language of
Hoffman et al. (1996), page 655, ‘. . . subjects bring their ongoing repeated game experience and
reputations from the world into the laboratory [the experiment]. . . ’. Because our objective is to
measure basic trust and trustworthiness in British society we want to tap into the experiences
that subjects draw from real life trust situations. It is precisely their drawing on their social
context that should give the experiment external validity. We believe that our design makes it
highly likely that Es’ decisions reﬂect their habitual practices in these situations—their sense of
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Table 3. Logistic regression for the log-odds of trusting
(column (1)) and trustworthiness (column (2))†
Variable (1), (2),
trust trustworthiness
(give £10) (return £22)
Age 0.038‡ −0.014
(0.012) (0.025)
Female 0.17 −0.03
(0.28) (0.53)
Financial situation
(reference, ‘Comfortable’)
‘Doing alright’ −1.29‡ −0.66
(0.60) (0.62)
‘Just about getting by’ −1.06§ −1.24§
(0.61) (0.72)
‘Finding it difﬁcult’ −0.21 −1.84‡
0.78 (0.76)
Homeowner 0.62§ 0.51
(0.34) (0.62)
Marital status (reference,
married or cohabiting)
Widow(er) −0.50 1.21
(0.53) (0.90)
Divorced or separated 0.93‡ 1.92‡
(0.44) (0.88)
Never married 0.45 0.25
(0.49) (0.47)
Active in organization 0.59§ 0.35
on regular basis (0.30) (0.55)
Constant −1.984 1.099
N 166 80
Wald χ2(10) 47.67 53.26
p-value 0.0000 0.0000
†Standard errors are given in parentheses, corrected for clus-
tering on the interviewer.
‡Statistically different from 0 at the 0.05 level.
§Signiﬁcantly different from 0 at the 0.10 level.
reciprocity, fairness or sensitivity to obligations—and the Rs’ decisions reﬂect their expectation
of such behaviour. (Laboratory experiments by McCabe et al. (2003) using binary trust games
similar to that used here, in which R’s expectation is known to E, suggest that E’s attribution of
intentions to R is important in E’s decision to fulﬁl trust or not.)
5. Experimental outcomes
Our basic ﬁgures are that 43% of Rs passed on £10 (‘trusted’), and 50% of Es returned the
speciﬁed £22 (were ‘trustworthy’). These should give us a snapshot of the level of basic trust and
trustworthiness in British society in simple trust situations involving strangers, in which stakes
are relatively low and E knows that R’s decision was taken on the expectation that £22 would
be returned.
After the Rs had made their decision and inserted it in the sealed envelope, the interviewer
gave the participant a short sheet of questions concerning how they made their decision. These
were ﬁlled out in private and put in another sealed envelope so that the interviewer did not know
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Table 4. Logistic regression for the log-odds of trusting in the experiment (col-
umn (1)) and in the survey question (column (2))†
Variable (1), (2),
experiment survey question
(give £10) (say ‘most people can
be trusted’)
Age 0.033‡ −0.003
(0.012) (0.008)
Female 0.38 −0.41
(0.34) (0.30)
Financial situation (reference,
‘Comfortable’ or ‘Finding it difﬁcult’)
‘Doing alright’ or ‘Just about getting by’ −1.24‡ −0.14
(0.43) (0.31)
Homeowner 0.82‡ 0.25
(0.34) (0.36)
Marital status (reference, married or
cohabiting or widow(er))
Divorced or separated or never married 1.00‡ 0.35
(0.34) (0.29)
Active in organization on regular basis 0.37 −0.08
(0.35) (0.40)
Openness −0.18 0.53‡
(0.18) (0.23)
Neuroticsm 0.15 −0.58‡
(0.26) (0.22)
‘Poor’ mental health (GHQ caseness >2) −0.81§ −0.64‡
(0.42) (0.32)
Constant −2.512 0.187
N 147 215
Wald χ2(9) 46.11 47.83
p-value 0.0000 0.0000
†Standard errors are given in parentheses, corrected for clustering on the interviewer.
‡Statistically different from 0 at the 0.05 level.
§Signiﬁcantly different from 0 at the 0.10 level.
how subjects replied. The ﬁrst questionwas ‘When youmade your decision aboutwhether to give
£10, did you weigh up the chances of getting your money back?’. Nearly 80% of Rs answered
‘yes’. This is reassuring for our measure of trust because ‘trust’ is by nature an expectation
(Gambetta, 1988; Barr, 2003) and entails a self-interested aim to gain more if trust is fulﬁlled.
We now consider how the decisions in the experiment vary with personal characteristics.
Table 2 provides descriptive statistics for the variables, and Table 3 presents logistic regressions
for the odds that Rs give £10 and the odds that Es return £22. The regressions suggest that Rs
are more likely to trust if they are older, are a homeowner, are active in an organization or are
divorced or separated rather than married or cohabiting. (A potential problem with inclusion
of the organization variable is that those who are more disposed to trust may be more likely
to be active in organizations.) Those who describe their ﬁnancial situation as ‘doing alright’ or
‘just about getting by’ are less likely to trust than those who are ‘comfortable’ or ‘ﬁnding it very
difﬁcult’, suggesting a U-shaped relation between trust and ﬁnancial situation. The former may
feel sufﬁciently comfortable to risk £10, whereas the latter may feel so poor that they may just
as well risk £10 in the hope of gaining £22.
Es are less likely to be trustworthy if they ﬁnd their ﬁnancial situation is ‘difﬁcult’ or they
are ‘just about getting by’, suggesting that trustworthiness may be a ‘luxury’ that some cannot
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afford. Es are more likely to be trustworthy if they are divorced or separated rather than married
or cohabiting.
In studying the effect of other personal attributes on trusting, because of our small sample size,
we try to economize on parameters by imposing two sets of statistically acceptable restrictions.
One is the reference group for ﬁnancial situation that includes those who are ‘comfortable’ and
‘ﬁnding it difﬁcult’, whom we ﬁnd to be more trusting, as opposed to those ‘doing alright’ and
‘just about getting by’, whom we ﬁnd to be less trusting. The other is that the reference group
for marital status contains the widowed along with those cohabiting or married, and these are
compared with the divorced, separated or never married. This simpliﬁcation is justiﬁable for
we ﬁnd that being a widow(er) does not make a signiﬁcant difference for trust relative to being
married or cohabiting, whereas its effect on trust is signiﬁcantly different from being divorced
or separated (p=0:01) and nearly signiﬁcantly different from being never married (p=0:11). In
addition, the never married are not signiﬁcantly different in their trusting behaviour from the
divorced or separated. (On either an Akaike or Bayesian information criterion, this restricted
model for trusting dominates the model in Table 3, and also other restricted models that are
acceptable on a likelihood ratio test criterion.)
In the ﬁrst column of Table 4, we introduce three new variables compared with Table 3. These
are factor scores for two of the ‘big ﬁve’ personality traits—‘openness’ and ‘neuroticism’—and
the third is an indicator of mental health—scoring 3 or more on the 12-point ‘caseness’ indica-
tor taken from the GHQ questionnaire. There is no evidence that these personality traits affect
trust, but those in poorer mental health are less likely to trust. The other variables have effects
that are similar to those in Table 3, although the effect of regular activity in an organization
is smaller and no longer statistically signiﬁcant. None of these three additional variables affect
the odds of being trustworthy (the results are not shown).
Comparisons with the previous two studies using representative population samples (Fehr
et al., 2002; Bellemare andKroeger, 2007) are limited by different dependent variables (amounts
sent and returned rather than ‘trust or not’ and ‘be trustworthy or not’), use of the ‘strategy
method’ by Bellemare and Kroeger (2007) for studying trustee behaviour (a statement of the
amount that they would return for all 11 possible amounts that they could receive) and different
covariates included in the analyses (e.g. questions about subjective beliefs about the behaviour of
other players but not marital status or mental health). Within these limitations, there are some
similarities and differences with our results. In contrast with Bellemare and Kroeger (2007), we
do not ﬁnd a U-shaped age effect for trust behaviour, but rather we ﬁnd trust increasing with
age (in the neighbourhood of the mean age in our sample, Bellemare and Kroeger (2007) found
amounts sent declining with age). We use a person’s own perception of their ﬁnancial circum-
stances rather than personal income, and we allow for and ﬁnd a U-shaped effect of ﬁnancial
circumstances on trust. The other two studies did not make this allowance and found an insig-
niﬁcant income effect. Bellemare and Kroeger (2007) found that women send more money, and
we also ﬁnd that women are more likely to trust, but the effect is not statistically signiﬁcant,
unless we control for risk preferences (Table 8 in Section 7).
6. Survey questions versus behavioural measures
Could have we dispensed with the experiment, at least for measuring trusting behaviour, by
just using the common question about trust—‘Generally speaking, would you say that most
people can be trusted, or that you can’t be too careful in dealing with people?’—which has
been run in the BHPS and many other surveys? Table 5 shows that this question has absolutely
no predictive power for people’s trusting behaviour as measured in our experiment. It weakly
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Table 5. Attitudinal questions in the survey and trust and trustworthiness
in the experiment
Behaviour Most people Cannot be Other; p-value
can be trusted too careful depends
% of Rs giving £10 43.1% 42.7% 44.4% 0.995
Column N .=100%/ 58 103 9
% of Es returning £22 55.3% 43.6% 57.1% 0.547
Column N .=100%/ 38 39 7
suggests, however, that those who answer that most people can be trusted are more likely to
be trustworthy in the experiment. Although the differences are not signiﬁcant for the Es either,
the pattern of results matches the ﬁndings by Glaeser et al. (2000) and Sapienza et al. (2007).
This suggests that some of those who say that others are mostly to be trusted may be inferring
from, as it were, a sample of 1, namely from their own behavioural inclinations. This result
matches other experimental ﬁndings. (‘In a succession of experimental studies exploring the cir-
cumstances surrounding cooperation in n-person prisoner’s dilemmas, we have collected data
about subjects’ expectations of others’ behaviour. One of our most consistent ﬁndings through-
out these studies—a ﬁnding replicated by others’ work—is that cooperators expect signiﬁcantly
more cooperation than do defectors. . . . [there are further] ﬁndings consistent with expectations
being dependent on the actor’s own behaviour . . .’ (our emphasis; Orbell and Dawes (1991),
page 519)). In particular, Schechter (2007), page 281, found that
‘the share the player returns to the trustor when playing the role of trustee is highly correlated with the
amount he sends to the trustee when playing the role of trustor’.
In the second column of Table 4, we use the same variables to account for variation in trust
measured by the positive response (‘most people can be trusted’) to the survey question. As in
Bellemare and Kroeger (2007), the differences are remarkable. The variables that did well in
predicting trust by using the behavioural measure in the ﬁrst column are not statistically signiﬁ-
cant, and people who are more open and less neurotic appear more likely to trust according to
the survey measure. The only similarity is in the effect of poor mental health. Thus, it appears
that the survey question is not helpful in analysing how trust varies within the population.
Laboratory evidence from University of Chicago Master of Business Administration stu-
dents provided by Sapienza et al. (2007) suggests that the standard survey question reﬂects only
people’s expectations about others’ trustworthiness. We can test this hypothesis with our data
by using the follow-up questions after Rs had made their decision. The 80% of Rs who said that
they had weighed the chances of getting their money back were asked the follow-up question
‘What did you think your chances of getting your money back were?’. The ﬁrst row of Table 6
shows that those who were more optimistic about receiving £22 in return were more likely to say
that ‘most people can be trusted’, suggesting that the survey question captures to some extent
the expectations component of trust decisions.
The second row of Table 6 indicates that the person’s expectation of the chances of return is
strongly related to their experimental trust decision, with more optimistic Rs being consistently
more likely to trust, which is also reassuring for our trust measure. Nevertheless, the failure of
the survey question to predict trusting behaviour in the experiment that is evident in Table 5
indicates that there is either insufﬁcient content about expectations in the survey question, or
that there is another dimension that plays an important role in addition to expectations or both.
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Table 6. Expected chances of return and trust in both the experiment and
the survey
Behaviour Less than 50–50 More than p-value
50–50 50–50
% of Rs who say 27.8% 39.6% 80% 0.036
‘most people can be trusted’
Column N .=100%/ 72 52 5
% of Rs giving £10 23.2% 69.2% 80% 0.000
Column N .=100%/ 72 52 5
This second dimension could be the disposition or preference that individuals have to take risks,
namely to allow themselves to be exposed to the potential opportunism of others.
7. Risk preferences and trust
Few studies have studied the effect of attitudes to risk on trust, despite the fact that the trust
decision is basically a bet on the trustworthiness of a stranger (e.g. Eckel and Wilson (2004) and
Schechter (2007)). The ﬁrst risk-related question that we asked is ‘Are you generally a person
who is fully prepared to take risks or do you try to avoid taking risks? Please tick a box on the
scale, where 0 means “unwilling to take risks” and the value 10 means “fully prepared to take
risks”.’ This is the same question as was asked in the 2004 wave of the German Socio-economic
Panel. Dohmen et al. (2005) conducted a complementary ﬁeld experiment and found that this
measure is a good predictor of actual risk taking behaviour. The second question also comes
from the German Socio-economic Panel. It asks about willingness to take risks not in general
but in trusting strangers, again on an 11-point scale.
Our risk measures show that, similarly to the German data, the two risk scales are correl-
ated (r = 0:46), but respondents are less willing to take risks in trusting strangers than they
are willing to take risks in general. This is evidence that, when the outcome depends on other
people’s decisions, risk is perceived differently from the risk of losing in a game of chance or in
the stock market and may reﬂect ‘exploitation’ or ‘betrayal’ aversion (Bohnet and Zeckhauser,
2004; Bohnet et al., 2008).
We test whether the 11-point ‘willingness to take risks’ scales affect trust and trustworthiness.
There was no evidence that ‘general willingness to take risks’ affected trust behaviour, a result
that is consistent with Eckel and Wilson (2004), but not with Sapienza et al. (2007) or Schechter
(2007). By contrast, Rs who expressmore willingness to take risks in trusting strangers were both
more likely to respond that ‘most people can be trusted’ in the survey (second rowofTable 7) and
Table 7. Willingness to take risks in trusting strangers and
trust in both the experiment and the survey
Behaviour Scale 0–5 Scale 6–10 p-value
% of Rs giving £10 38.3% 54.8% 0.093
Column N .=100%/ 128 31
% who say ‘most people 28.1% 64.5% 0.000
can be trusted’
Column N .=100%/ 128 31
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Table 8. Logistic regression for the log-odds of trusting in the experiment (column (1))
and in the survey question (column (2))†
Variable (1), experiment (2), survey question
(give £10) (say ‘most people
can be trusted’)
Age 0.048‡ 0.017
(0.015) (0.012)
Female 0.58§ −0.41
(0.33) (0.29)
Financial situation (reference,
‘Comfortable’ or ‘Finding it difﬁcult’)
‘Doing alright’ or ‘Just about getting by’ −1.27‡ −0.13
(0.43) (0.35)
Homeowner 0.91‡ 0.31
(0.33) (0.39)
Marital status (reference, married,
or cohabiting, or widow(er))
Divorced, or separated or never married 0.88‡ 0.40
(0.33) (0.38)
Active in organization on regular basis 0.52 −0.26
(0.35) (0.41)
Openness −0.32 0.39
(0.22) (0.28)
Neuroticism 0.24 −0.49§
(0.28) (0.29)
‘Poor’ mental health (GHQ caseness >2) −0.93‡ −0.55
(0.46) (0.35)
Willingness to take risks in trusting strangers 0.21§ 0.45‡
(0.12) (0.08)
Constant −3.999 −2.656
N 143 211
Wald χ2(10) 42.44 63.67
p-value 0.0000 0.0000
†Standard errors are given in parentheses, corrected for clustering on the interviewer.
‡Statistically different from 0 at the 0.05 level.
§Signiﬁcantly different from 0 at the 0.10 level.
to pass on the £10 in the experiment (ﬁrst rowofTable 7).Thus, there appears tobe somebehavio-
ural content in this question. Nevertheless, if we use the dichotomous risk variable in Table 7
to predict whether people trust in the experiment, we would still be wrong for 38% of the cases
who are ‘risk averse’ according to this measure (scale 0–5) and, for those who are not risk averse,
we would be wrong for 45% of the cases. Overall, we would be wrong for 40% of the subjects.
In Table 8, we test further whether the full 0–10-scale for willingness to take risks in trusting
strangers affects trust as measured by either the experiment or the survey question. In the ﬁrst
column, it is positively related to the experimental trust measure. Because this risk scale is neg-
atively related to age and being female, but not signiﬁcantly related to the other explanatory
variables, there is an increase in the age effect and in the inﬂuence of being female on the odds of
trusting relative to Table 4. The effect of the risk willingness scale on the survey trust response
in the second column is large, and its inclusion reduces the effect of the personality traits,
because more open people are more willing to take risks in trusting strangers and more neurotic
individuals are less willing. This strong effect suggests that, contrary to Sapienza et al. (2007),
the survey trust question contains information not only about expectations, but also willingness
to take risks in trusting strangers. Indeed, risk aversion in trusting strangers signiﬁcantly predicts
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responses to the survey questionwithin eachof the twomain expectations groups: 25%compared
with 60% (‘less than 50–50’) and 35% compared with 69% (‘50–50 or more’). Despite this direct
relationshipbetween the riskwillingness indicator andapositive response to the surveyquestion,
the latter does not predict experimental trust well, because within each risk group of Table 7,
for nearly half of the subjects, their survey response contradicts their experimental behaviour.
We conclude that behavioural responses to experiments like that carried out here provide
measures of trust and trustworthiness, which are both reliable and superior to the common sur-
vey questions regarding trust. The cost of running these experiments is low relative to the cost
of making contact with participants. Thus, the marginal costs of these measures are low when a
representative survey is beingundertaken for other purposes.Our results also suggest that aques-
tion that is concernedwithwillingness to take risks in trusting strangers is a rough but cheapway
tomonitor changes in propensity to trust (but not trustworthiness) over time in repeated surveys.
8. Conclusions
Overall, 43% of people were willing to trust a stranger in our experiment, and their trust was
rewarded half of the time. Analysis of variation in the trust behaviour in our survey suggests
that trust increases with age, although we cannot rule out a generational effect. Also, people
who are homeowners are more likely to trust, whereas those in poorer mental health are less
likely. Surprisingly, both people whose ﬁnancial situation is ‘comfortable’ and those who are
‘ﬁnding it difﬁcult’ are more likely to trust. Trustworthiness is less likely if a person’s ﬁnancial
situation is perceived by them as ‘just getting by’ or ‘difﬁcult’, suggesting that trustworthiness
towards strangers is a ‘luxury’ that some people cannot ‘afford’.
People who are divorced or separated are both more likely to trust and more likely to be
trustworthy compared with those who are married or cohabiting. There is also weaker evidence
that people who never married are more likely to trust than people who are married or cohab-
iting. These results for trust may reﬂect greater incentives for people not living with a partner
to interact with strangers and as a result also more experience in doing so. More experience
promotes trust if their experiences are predominantly positive because their expectation that
people will be trustworthy is higher. Our experimental result that half of trustees are trustworthy
even with completely anonymous partners is broadly consistent with the assumption that trust
in strangers is more likely to be rewarded than not in British society, because in most day-to-day
transactions trusters and trustees have some information about each other, and certainly more
than they have in our experiment.
Should the experiment be carried out repeatedly in panel surveys like the BHPS and the new
UK Household Longitudinal Study? Although the case is not entirely straightforward, we think
that there are very good reasons for doing so. The potential problem that is inherent in panel
repetition is that subjects might start to treat the experiment as a ‘game’ rather than tapping into
their experiences from real life trust situations in one-shot games. However, it might be inter-
esting to study how Rs’ decisions in subsequent rounds are affected by having trust rewarded
or violated, although it would remain unclear how to make inferences about real life trust situ-
ations from this behaviour. Panel repetition can also be valuable for assessing causal inﬂuences
as it can allow for unobserved individual heterogeneity as well as dynamics.
One way that we could use experiments in panel surveys to monitor changes in trust behav-
iour over time, while avoiding the potential problem arising from panel repetition, is to run
the experiment on different small subsets of the panel sample each year. In other words, create
a series of repeated cross-sections from within the panel. This would also be relatively cheap
because the payment arrangements (cash and cheques) need only to be set up for this subsample
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each year. Having repeated measures of trusting and trustworthiness would give us a simple yet
precise sense of the relative health of social relations in the country.
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Appendix A: Experiment script
LIVING IN BRITAIN 
SPRING 2007 
QUESTIONNAIRE 
D0a. DATE OF INTERVIEW DAY MONTH YEAR 
FOR INTERVIEWER REFERENCE  
 (T1 = 0 & T2 = 0) 
“This respondent is ineligible for interview.” 
(T1 = 1 & T2 = 1) 
“This is a first-stage respondent.  You will be using PINK coloured materials for this respondent. 
Please ensure that this respondent has received the card with the £10 note.  Before you start, 
make sure the respondent has opened it and seen the money.” 
(T1 = 1 & T2 = 2) 
“This is a first-stage respondent.  You will be using PINK coloured materials for this respondent. 
Please ensure that this respondent has received the card with the £10 note and £2 coin.  Before 
you start, make sure the respondent has opened it and seen the money.” 
(T1 = 2) 
“This is a second-stage respondent.  You will be using the CREAM coloured materials for this 
respondent. 
Please hand over the two checks for £40 and £18 at the appropriate point in the experiment.” 
THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT MUST BE READ TO ALL RESPONDENTS:
This interview is completely voluntary -- if we should come to any question that you 
don't want to answer, just let me know and we'll go on to the next question. 
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For R-subjects 
SC1 CHECK 
IF T1 = 1 & T2 = 1 GO TO SC1 (£10 OPTIONS) 
ELSE IF T1 = 1 & T2 = 2 GO TO SC1 (£12 OPTIONS) 
ELSE IF T1 = 2 GO TO SC5 
SC1 INTERVIEWER NOTE
THIS RESPONDENT SHOULD HAVE RECEIVED {£10} (IF T2 = 1) / {£12} (IF T2 = 
2) IN CASH.
PLEASE MAKE SURE YOU HAVE HANDED OVER THE CARD WITH THE {£10 
NOTE} (IF T2 = 1) {£10 NOTE PLUS £2 COIN} (IF T2 = 2) BEFORE YOU START 
AND MAKE SURE THE RESPONDENT HAS OPENED IT AND SEEN THE MONEY 
READ OUT
As you know, we are running an experiment on how people make simple financial 
decisions. In this experiment we randomly matched you with another person.  The 
other person does not know your identity or anything about you and I know nothing 
about the other person.  I will have no contact with this person.  They will be 
interviewed by another interviewer following your interview. 
Let’s start by explaining a bit more about the experiment and the choice you 
need to make.  We have given you {£10} (if T2 = 1) / {£12) (if T2 = 2).  This 
money is yours to keep as a “Thank you” for participating in this survey.  In 
this experiment, however, we are giving you the opportunity to give {this £10} 
(if T2 = 1) / {£10 of this} (if T2 = 2) to the person we have randomly matched 
you with.  If you give {£10} (if T2 = 1) / {£10 of this} (if T2 = 2) to the person 
we matched you with, we will add £30, so that the other person receives £40.  
We will then ask them to decide  
whether to return £22 of this to you and keep £18, 
OR
whether to keep the £40 
The other person is absolutely free to choose either option. 
Your decision needs to be made in private so please do not tell me now,  
even if you know immediately what you are going to do. I will never know
what you decided. 
HAND LAMINATED SHOWCARD SIDE 1 TO RESPONDENT 
READ OUT 
You must decide whether or not to give £10 to the other person.  
If you decide not to give the £10, your participation in the experiment ends.  
We will just finish off the rest of the interview. 
If you decide to give the £10, you may receive £22 back, or nothing.  You will 
find out about the other person’s decision and receive payment, if any, in  
about four weeks. 
In this experiment both you and the other person are free to decide what you 
want to do. There is no ‘correct’ decision. 
CONTINUE  
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SC2 HAND THE RESPONDENT THE ENVELOPE AND ASK THEM TO TURN 
OVER THE LAMINATED CARD TO SIDE 2 FOR THE INSTRUCTIONS 
READ OUT 
If you decide NOT to give the £10 to the other person, you should put the 
empty card in the envelope.   
If you decide to give the £10 to the other person, put the £10 note inside the 
card and put it in the envelope. 
Please seal the envelope before you hand it back to me.  Someone else will 
open the envelope and I will never know your decision. 
Can you please make your decision now.  I will leave the room / turn my back 
so you can make your choice in private. Please take as long as you need to 
make your decision. 
Interviewer code: 
Envelope with card returned  
SC3 ONCE THE RESPONDENT HAS HANDED BACK THE SEALED 
ENVELOPE WITH THE CARD PASS THEM THE SINGLE PINK PAGE SELF-
COMPLETION QUESTIONNAIRE TO COMPLETE TOGETHER WITH ANOTHER 
ENVELOPE  
READ OUT 
We would next like you to answer a few questions concerning your decision.  
Can you please complete the questions on the sheet and then seal it in the 
envelope before you hand it back to me.  I will turn my back again so that you 
can complete the questions in private. 
Interviewer code: 
Questionnaire returned  
SC4 READ OUT 
Thank-you.  We will process your decision and, if you gave £10 and the 
person we paired you with returns £22, we will send you a cheque for £22.  In 
any case, we will notify you about the outcome.  This should take about four 
weeks. 
That is the end of the experiment but I just have a few other questions I’d like 
to ask you.  This will take only 5 or 10 minutes. 
CONTINUE  GO TO H0
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For E-subjects 
SC5 READ OUT 
As you know, we are running an experiment on how people make simple financial 
decisions. In this experiment we randomly matched you with another person.  The 
other person does not know your identity or anything about you.  I myself have had 
no contact with this person.  They have already been interviewed by another 
interviewer. 
Let’s start by explaining a bit more about the experiment and the choices you can 
make about what to do with £40.  This £40 has been made available to you because 
of the decision made by the other person when they were interviewed.  This is what 
has happened so far. 
The other person received {£10} (IF T2 = 1) / {£12} (IF T2 = 2) from us for taking part 
in the experiment. 
We told them that they would have the opportunity to receive £22 if they chose to give 
you £10.  They were told that if they gave you £10, we would add £30 to make £40, 
which is the amount you now have available.  
The other person made their decision knowing that you would be asked to decide 
whether to keep £18 and return £22 to them or keep all £40. 
They decided to give you the £10 knowing this was the choice you would be making. 
Your decision needs to be made in private so please do not tell me now,  
even if you know immediately what you are going to do.  I will never know 
what you decided. 
HAND OVER THE CREAM SHOWCARD SIDE 1 
READ OUT 
We now ask you to decide whether you want to … 
Keep the £40  
  OR
Keep the £18 and return £22 
Let me stress that you are absolutely free to choose either option and that the 
other person knew you would be free to choose.  There is no ‘correct’ 
decision. 
CONTINUE  
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SC6 HAND THE RESPONDENT THE ENVELOPE WITH THE CHEQUES AND 
ASK TO OPEN 
ASK TO REFER TO THE CREAM SHOWCARD SIDE 2 
HAND THE RESPONDENT THE CREAM DECISION CARD AND 
ENVELOPE 
READ OUT 
Here are two cheques made out to you, one for £18 and the other for £40. 
Can you look at this card and decide whether you want to keep £40 OR keep 
£18 and return £22 to the person who made the £40 available to you. 
Put both the card with your decision and cheque in the envelope and seal it 
before handing it back to me.  Someone else will open the envelope and I will 
never know your decision. 
Let me stress again that you are absolutely free to choose either option.  
There is no ‘correct’ decision. 
So that you can make your decision in private, I will leave the room/turn my 
back.  Please take as long as you need to make your decision.
Interviewer code: 
Envelope with card returned  
SC7 ONCE THE RESPONDENT HAS HANDED BACK THE SEALED 
ENVELOPE WITH THE DECISION CARD PASS THEM THE SINGLE CREAM 
COLOURED SELF-COMPLETION QUESTIONNAIRE TOGETHER WITH 
ANOTHER ENVELOPE  
READ OUT 
Next, we would like you to answer a few questions.  Can you please 
complete the questions on this sheet, then seal it in the envelope before you 
hand it back to me.  I will turn my back again so that you can complete the 
questions in private. 
Interviewer code: 
Questionnaire returned  
SC8 READ OUT
Thank-you.  You can cash the cheque that you kept immediately. 
That is the end of the experiment but I just have a few other questions I’d like 
to ask you.  This will take only 5 or 10 minutes. 
CONTINUE  GO TO H0
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